Weve heard over and over again that weight loss is important in managing PCOS and that diet and exercise are more effective than medications in improving your PCOS symptoms. Previously, weve focused a lot on the importance of diet and the kind of diet we should all be following.

But, we havent really tackled the topic of exercise and just about every day I get emails asking me about what exercise we should be doing and how much. So, I think its time to have a closer look at exercise and its importance in managing our symptoms.

My own relationship with exercise is a bit hit and miss. Before getting married, I went to the gym about 5 times a week, doing cardio and circuit training. I looked and felt great but my PCOS was undiagnosed and I didnt have many symptoms. It was also 7 years ago before I settled into married life and had a baby.Diet and exercise are more effective than medications in improving your PCOS symptoms

I have often said that if I understand why I need to do something, Im far more likely to actually do it. That is why I think we need to have a closer look at the benefits of exercise for women with PCOS. Lets have a look at what the research says.

Also, women with PCOS suffer from chronic inflammation (more on this is a future article because I think its a big one). But,regular exercise improves inflammation markers (2) which is hugely important because chronic inflammation is linked to insulin resistance. (3) Once again, this shows that exercise improves sensitivity to insulin.

Theres one final thing that I want to mention. A group of researchers looked at a number of studies and literature regarding exercise and PCOS. They considered 8 studies and found that most consistent improvements included improved ovulation, reduced IR (930%) and weight loss (4.510%). Improvements were not dependant on the type of exercise, frequency or length of exercise sessions. (4)

So basically were saying that even if you dont lose weight when exercising, you are still working on improving your:

Youll see in all of the research studies weve looked at, there is a common thread: insulin resistance. Lets have a look at why this is key with PCOS.

Researchers have found that insulin plays a key role in the development of PCOS, even if we are not insulin resistant. You see, insulin acts on our ovaries to stimulate the production of male hormones (testosterone). This happens in all women but our ovaries tend to be oversensitive to insulin, producing too much testosterone.

But wait, theres more. Insulin also acts to decrease the amount of Sex Hormone Binding Globulin (SHBG). Testosterone should bind to SHBG and not be free floating to cause havoc on our systems. If SHBG is low, there will be more free testosterone in our systems. (5)

And here is the kicker: testosterone causes most of our PCOS symptoms: increased hair growth, male pattern baldness, acne, irregular cycles. So, you can see that it is VITAL that we mange our insulin levels to manage our testosterone. Everything that I have mentioned on this site in terms of diet is aimed at managing insulin and testosterone through diet. Now you have another way of managing it through exercise.

So, weve said that exercise is really beneficial to managing our PCOS as it helps to manage insulin levels which in turn improves our testosterone and SHBG levels. I can already hear the question youre going to ask next: How much and what kind of exercise should we be doing? Thats too big a topic to tackle in this article so stay tuned for the follow up article on exercise!

Id love to hear your experiences of managing PCOS with exercise. Also, do you have any tips on how to stay motivated with exercise? Id love to hear them!

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PCOS and Exercise - The Benefits | PCOS Diet Support

Why Imparta for your Sales Training?

Imparta offers comprehensive Sales Training solutions across all sectors, at all levels of a sales organisation and on a global basis. We have the methodologies, experience and people to deliver transformationalsales programmes, whether you selldirectly to large enterprises, corporates or SMEs, or through channels and partners.

Many of the worlds best-known and most ambitious companies such as Intel, Cisco, Telefnica, Canon, Lonza and the WPP group, choose Imparta. Our salesmethodologiesandprogrammesare research-based, continuously updated, and highly practical. We know, because we take our own medicine.

Our programmes are modular, so you can combine different elements to create the perfect intervention for each team.

They are flexible, so you can reach a wide audience with the Virtual Sales Academy, train in-depth with experiential workshops, or deliver rapid ROI with high-impact deal and account coaching.

They are customised, so you can be sure the exercises, role-plays, examples and stories we use will relate directly to your business.

And finally, the impact is measured and sticky, thanks to the use of our Capability Building System.

Please select a specific sales need you wish to address from the options below, and well give youa few insights into the issue and how we can help.

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Do you know your personal strengths? A very easy question, but if I would be the interviewer in an job-interview, what would you answer? Can you name your biggest personal strengthsinstantly?

Knowing your personal strengths and weaknesses can help you a lot in choosing the right career or making good decisions. Becauseif you are able to focus what you do around your personalstrengths, you have the chance to create something remarkable, while making it look like its almost effortless for you.

Yourbiggest personal strength is what is easy for you.[Tweet this!]

And probably not easy for everyone else. This is what you do best and where your real talents are. If you want to have a comfortable life you should focus on using those strength to the fullest, because thats where you have ancompetitiveadvantage and where you can create the most value for other people.

Also, similar to knowing your personal values, knowing your strengths and weaknesses raises your self-awareness and gives youclarity.

When you try to find your own strength, think about what comes naturally easy for you. And dont choose attributes that you would like to have or that you admire. This is a typical trap. Especially avoid those which seem hard to do for you.

Instead choose those that are describing your core.What is so obvious that you almost doesnt notice it in you anymore, since it is like your very nature?

Here are some examples of typical peoples strengths:

Choose those that fit yourstrengthsand then compare them against each other to bring them into an order. 1 is your biggest strength and 5 (or do 10 if you like) is at the 5th place. When you compare them ask yourself: What can I do better?

My own biggest personal strength are:

I would love to read your own list in the comments below!

It can also be interesting think about a big strength you have that isrelativelyrare in most other humans. For instance strategic thinking is a relatively rare quality, while for instance confidence or creativity is not really. So when you are thinking about your career, maybe you should build your work around those personal strengths that you do possess but most other people dont. Then you can create the most value for others.

Its also important not to confuse strengths with likes. What you like to do is notnecessarily what you do best. It can be, but its not a given. Of course, for a successful career you want to combine these twoin order to overlap your strengths with your passion.

Equally important as knowing your personal strengths is knowing your personal weaknesses. Those areattributesthat you will have a hard time when doing it, its difficult for you. Thats why you should try to let people who are better than you do this.

Everybody has weaknesses. Its a natural thing, humans are not perfect. So dont beembarrassedto look at your weaknesses. It will help you to improve yourself to know them.

And here are some examples of typical peoples weaknesses:

There are probably more, so dont hesitate to use them and write them into the comments.

Here are my personal top 5 weaknesses:

So I have to work on those weaknesses in order to not make them matter too much in my life. Everybody has 1 or 2 weaknesses that you have to keep in check. If you dont they will produce negative consequences and may even disrupt your efforts while you use your personal strength.

So identify them, and if you are brave enough, write them into the comments below as well! 🙂

Thats a tough question. In general its much better to focus on using your personal strengths and try to control your weaknesses. A good business strategy can be to focus your energies on your strength only and try to outsource or delegate tasks that would bring you into your personal weaknesses.

On the other hand,facingyour weaknesses can have a lot of potential for personal growth. If you are not good at something, improving even slightly can have a nice positive impact on your overall quality of life.

An example would be if you are a lousy cook, improving your cooking skills slightly could give you benefits in everyday life. You dont have to be a master to profit from cooking. Same would be if you are not good at sports. Starting to run can be really helpful for your overall health, although you will never run a marathon or start at the olympic games.

I remember adocumentaryabout MichaelJordanwhere it said that Jordan was never good at shooting from the distance, but he improved it to a master level by constant practice. Same with his defensive game. It said He asked what are my weaknesses and how can I make those my strength?Well I would say these where no real weaknesses, they just werent his absolute strengths in the game. Still, by almost fanatic practice he improved even this part of his game. It may would have given other results if he would had to play chess against Garry Kasparov on the basketball court 😉

So knowing your personal strengths and weaknesses can give you a lot of insights in understanding and changing yourself. And it will help you to make the right decisions.

Please do the little exercise and reveal your own personal strengths and weaknesses. Write them into a comment and I might comment back on them later.

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What Are Your Personal Strengths and Weaknesses?

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Philosophical work on self-consciousness has mostly focused on the identification and articulation of specific epistemic and semantic peculiarities of self-consciousness, peculiarities which distinguish it from consciousness of things other than oneself. After drawing certain fundamental distinctions, and considering the conditions for the very possibility of self-consciousness, this article discusses the nature of those epistemic and semantic peculiarities.

The relevant epistemic peculiarities are mainly those associated with the alleged infallibility and self-intimation of self-consciousness. It has sometimes been thought that our consciousness of ourselves may be, under certain conditions, infallible, in the sense that it cannot go wrong: when we believe that some fact about us obtains, it does. It has also sometimes been thought that some forms of consciousness are self-intimating: if a certain fact about us obtains, we are necessarily going to be conscious that it does. These claims have come under heavy attack in more recent philosophical work, but it remains unclear whether some restricted forms of infallibility and self-intimation survive the attack.

The relevant semantic peculiarities have emerged in recent work in philosophy of language and mind. Two of them stand out: the so-called immunity to error through misidentification of our consciousness of ourselves and the special character of self-regarding (or de se) consciousness that cannot be assimilated to other kinds of consciousness. Some philosophers have argued that these are not genuine features of self-consciousness, while others have argued that, although genuine, they are not peculiar to self-consciousness. Other philosophers have defended the proposition that these features are genuine and peculiar to self-consciousness. We will consider the case for these claims in due course.

Throughout our waking life, we are conscious of a variety of things. We are often conscious of other people, of cars, trees, beetles, and other objects around us. We are conscious of their features: their colors, their shapes, and the sound they make. We are conscious of events involving them: car accidents, tree blooming, and so forth.

Sometimes we are also conscious of ourselves, our features, and the events that take place within us. Thus, we may become conscious, in a certain situation, of the fact that we are nervous or uncomfortable. We may become conscious of a rising anxiety, or of a sudden cheerfulness. Sometimes we are conscious of simpler things: that we are seeing red, or that we are thinking of tomorrows errands.

In addition, we sometimes have the sense that we are continuously conscious of ourselves going about our business in the world. Thus William James, who was very influential in the early days of experimental, systematic psychology (in addition to being the brother of novelist Henry James and a gifted writer himself), remarked once that whatever I may be thinking of, I am always at the same time more or less aware of myself, of my personal existence (James 1961: 42).

These forms of self-consciousnessconsciousness of ourselves and our personal existence, of our character traits and standing features, and of the thoughts that occur to us and the feelings that we experienceare philosophically fascinating, inasmuch as they are at once quite mysterious and closest to home. Our scientific theories of astrophysical objects that are incredibly distant from us in both space and time, or of the smallest particles that make up the sub-atomic layer of reality, are mature, sophisticated, and impressive. By contrast, we barely have anything worth the name scientific theory for self-consciousness and its various manifestations, in spite of self-consciousness being so much more familiar a phenomenonindeed the most familiar phenomenon of all.

Here, as elsewhere, the immaturity of our scientific understanding of self-consciousness invites philosophical reflection on the topic, and is anyway partly due precisely to deep philosophical puzzles about the nature of self-consciousness. Many philosophers have thought that self-consciousness exhibits certain peculiarities not to be found in consciousness of things other than ourselves, and indeed possibly not to be found anywhere else in nature.

Philosophical work on self-consciousness has thus mostly focused on the identification and articulation of these peculiarities. More specifically, it has sought some epistemic and semantic peculiarities of self-consciousness, that is, peculiarities as regards how we know, and more generally how we represent, ourselves and our internal lives. (In philosophical jargon, epistemology is the theory of knowledge and semantics ismore or lessthe theory of representation.) This entry will accordingly focus on these peculiarities. After drawing certain fundamental distinctions, and considering the conditions for the very possibility of self-consciousness, we will discuss first the nature of the relevant epistemic peculiarities and then (more extensively) the semantic ones.

Let us start by drawing some distinctions. (The distinctions I will draw are meant as conceptual distinctions. Whether they stand for real differences between the properties putatively picked out by the relevant concepts is a separate matter.) The first important distinction is between self-consciousness as a property of whole individuals and self-consciousness as a property of particular mental states. Thus, when we say My thought that p is self-conscious and I am self-conscious, the property we ascribe is in all likelihood different. My being self-conscious involves my being conscious of my self. But my thoughts being self-conscious does not involve my thoughts being conscious of its self, since (i) it does not have a self, and (ii) thoughts are not the kind of thing that can be conscious of anything. We may call the property that I have creature self-consciousness and the property that my thought has state self-consciousness.

Another distinction is between consciousness of oneself (ones self) and consciousness of a particular event or state that occurs within oneself. Compare I am self-conscious of myself thinking that p to I am self-conscious of my thought that p. The latter involves awareness of a particular thought of mine, but need not involve awareness of self or selfhood. It is a form of self-consciousness in the sense that it is directed inward, and takes as its object an internal state of mine. But it is not a form of self-consciousness in the stronger sense of involving consciousness of self. I will refer to the stronger variety as strong self-consciousness and the weaker as weak self-consciousness. State self-consciousness is consciousness of what happens within oneself, whereas creature self-consciousness is consciousness of oneself proper. (Note, however, that a mental state may be both creature- and state-self-conscious. Thus, if I am conscious of my thought that p as my thought, as a thought of mine, then I am conscious both of my thought and of myself.)

Another traditional distinction, which dates back to Kant, is between consciousness of oneself qua object and consciousness of oneself qua subject. Suppose I am conscious of Budapest (or of Budapest and its odors). I am the subject of the thought, its object is Budapest. But suppose now that I am conscious of myself (or of myself and my feelings). Now I am both the subject and the object of the thought. But although the subject and the object of the thought happen to be the same thing, there is still a conceptual distinction to be made between myself in my capacity as object of thought and myself in my capacity as subject of thought. That is to say, even though there is one entity here, there are two separate concepts for this entity, the self-as-subject concept and the self-as-object concept. To mark this difference, William James (1890) introduced a technical distinction between the I and the me. In its technical use, I (and its Mentalese correlate) refers to the self-as-subject, whereas me (and its Mentalese correlate) refers to the self-as-object. By Mentalese correlate, I mean the expression that would mean the same as I and me in something like the so-called language of thought (Fodor 1975) or Mentalese.)

Corresponding to these two concepts, or conceptions, of self, there would presumably be two distinct modes of presentation under which a person may be conscious of herself. She may be conscious of herself under the I description or under the me description. Thus, my state of self-consciousness may employ either the I mode of presentation or the me mode of presentation. (We could capture the difference, using James technical terminology, by distinguishing I am self-conscious that I think that p and I am self-conscious that methinks that p.) In the latter case, there is a sort of conceptual distance between the thing that does the thinking and the thing being thought about. Although I am thinking of myself, I am not thinking of myself as the thing that does the thinking. By contrast, in the former case, I am thinking of myself precisely as the thing that is therewith doing the thinking.

Through Kants influence on Husserl, philosophers in the phenomenological tradition have long held that something like consciousness of self-as-subject is a distinct, irreducible, and central aspect of our mental life. Philosophers in the analytic tradition have been more suspicious of it (for exceptions to this rule, see for instance Van Gulick 1988 and Strawson 1997). But the distinction between consciousness of self-as-subject and consciousness of self-as-object might be captured using analytic tools, through a distinction between transitive and intransitive self-consciousness (Kriegel 2003, 2004a). Compare I am self-conscious of thinking that p and I am self-consciously thinking that p. In the former, transitive form, self-consciousness is construed as a relation between me and my thinking. In the latter, intransitive form, it is construed as a modification of my thinking. That is, in the latter the self-consciousness term (if you will) does not denote a state of standing in a relation to my thought (or my thinking) that p. Rather, it designates the way I am having my thought (or doing my thinking). In transitive self-consciousness, the thought and the state of self-consciousness are treated as two numerically distinct mental states. By contrast, in intransitive self-consciousness, there is no numerical distinction between the thought and the state of self-consciousness: the thought is the state of self-consciousness. The adverb self-consciously denotes a way I am having my thought that p. No extra act of self-consciousness takes place after the thought that p occurs. Rather, self-consciously is how the thought that p occurs.

I have been speaking of the self-as-subject in terms of the thing that does the thinking, and correspondingly of consciousness of oneself as subject in terms of consciousness of oneself as the thing that does the thinking. But recent work in philosophical psychopathology counsels caution here. Schizophrenics suffering from thought insertion and alien voices delusions report that they are not in control of their thoughts. Indeed, they often envisage a particular individual who, they claim, is doing the thinking for them, or implants thoughts in their mind. Note that although they do not experience themselves as doing the thinking, they do experience the thinking as happening, in some sense, in them. To account for the experiential difference between doing the thinking and merely hosting the thinking, between authorship of ones thoughts and mere ownership of them (respectively), some philosophers have drawn a distinction between consciousness of oneself as agent and consciousness of oneself as subject (Campbell 1999, Graham and Stephens 2000). The distinction between self-as-agent and self-as-subject is orthogonal, however, to the distinction between self-as-object and self-as-subject. To avoid confusion, let us suggest a different terminology, that of self-as-author versus self-as-owner, and correspondingly, of consciousness of oneself as author of ones thoughts and consciousness of oneself as owner of ones thoughts. To be sure, in the normal go of things, ownership and authorship are inseparable. But the pathological cases show that there is daylight between the two notions.

Another important distinction is between propositional self-consciousness and non-propositional self-consciousness. There is no doubt that there is such a thing as propositional self-consciousness: consciousness that some self-related proposition obtains. Presumably, such self-consciousness has conceptual content. But a strong case can be made that there is a form of self-consciousness that is sub-propositional, as it were, and has non-conceptual content (Bermdez 1998). When a report of self-consciousness uses a that clause, as we just did, it necessarily denotes propositional self-consciousness. But when it does not, as is the case, for instance, with I am self-conscious of thinking that p, it is left open whether it is propositional or non-propositional self-consciousness that is denoted. That is, I am self-conscious of thinking that p is compatible with, but does not entail, I am self-conscious that I am thinking that p. In any case, the terminology leaves it open whether there is a non-propositional or non-conceptual form of self-consciousness.

Other distinctions can certainly be drawn. I have restricted myself to those that will play a role in the discussion to follow. They are five:

(a) State self-consciousness versus creature self-consciousness(b) Strong versus weak self-consciousness(c) Transitive versus intransitive self-consciousness(d) Consciousness of self-as-object versus consciousness of self-as-subject(e) Consciousness of self-as-author versus consciousness of self-as-owner

As I warned at the opening, these distinctions are meant as conceptual ones. This is doubly significant. First, the fact that there is a distinction between two concepts does not entail that there is a difference between the putative properties picked out by these concepts. Second, the existence of a concept does not entail the existence of the property putatively picked out by that concept. In fact, philosophers have questioned the very existence of self-consciousness.

Perhaps the best known philosophical threat to the very possibility of self-consciousness hails from Humes remarks in the Treatise of Human Nature (I, IV, vi): For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other I never can catch myself without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception.

This passage makes two separate claims, of different degrees of skepticism. The modest claim is:

(MC) Upon turning into oneself, one cannot catch oneself without a particular mental state.

MC rules out the possibility of a mental state whose sole object is the self. But though it disallows catching oneself without a perception, it does not disallow catching oneself with a perception. Hume makes the latter, stronger, immodest claim next, however:

(IC) Upon turning into oneself, one cannot catch anything but particular mental states.

IC rules out the possibility of any consciousness of ones self. That is, it rules out the possibility of creature self-consciousness, allowing only for state self-consciousness.

In assessing Humes claims, particularly the immodest one, we must ask, first, what did Hume expect to catch? And second, what sort of catching did he have in mind?

One way to deny the possibility of consciousness of oneself is to reject the existence of a self of which one might be conscious. But the inexistence of a self is not a sufficient condition for the impossibility of self-consciousness: there could still be thoroughly and systematically illusory experience of selfhood that gives rise to a form of (illusory) self-consciousness. Nor is such rejection a necessary condition for the impossibility of self-consciousness. Hume himself not only countenanced the self, he offered a theory of it, namely, the bundle theory. What Hume rejected was the existence of a substantival self, a self that is more than just a stream of consciousness and a sum of experiences. What he rejected is the reifying conception of the self according to which the self is an object among others in the world, a substrate that supports the internal goings-on unfolding therein but is distinct from, and somehow stands above, these proceedings. This rejection is shared today by several philosophers (see, for example, Dennett 1991).

This suggests an answer to our first question, concerning what Hume had expected to catch upon turning into himself. What he expected to catch is a self-substance (if you please). It is unclear, however, why Hume thought that consciousness of oneself, even non-illusory consciousness of oneself, required the existence of a substantival self. Consider how self-consciousness might play out within the framework of Humes own bundle theory. Upon turning into herself, a person might become conscious of a particular mental state, say an inexplicable cheerfulness, but become conscious of it as belonging to a larger bundle of mental states, perhaps a bundle that has a certain internal cohesion to it at and across time. In that case, we would be well justified to conceive of this person as conscious of her self.

As for the second question, concerning what sort of catching Hume had in mind, it appears that Hume envisioned a quasi-perceptual form of catching. He expected self-consciousness to involve some sort of direct encounter with the self. There is no question that one can believe (or otherwise think purely intellectually) that one is inexplicably cheerful. One can surely entertain purely intellectually the proposition I am inexplicably cheerful. But Hume wanted more than that. He wanted to be confronted with his self, by turning inward his minds eye, as he would with a chair upon directing his outward gaze in the right direction.

In other words, Hume was working with an introspective model of self-consciousness, according to which self-consciousness involves the employment of an inner sense: an internal mechanism whose operation is analogous in essential respects to the operation of the external senses. This inner sense conception was clearly articulated in Locke: The other fountain [of] ideas, is the perception of the operations of our own minds within us And though it be not sense, as having nothing to do with external objects; yet it is very like it, and might properly enough be called internal sense (Essay Concerning Human Understanding II, i, 4).

The plausibility of the introspective model is very much in contention. Thus, Rosenthal (1986) claims that for self-consciousness to be genuinely analogous with perceptual consciousness, the former would have to exhibit the sort of qualitative character the latter does; but since it does not, it is essentially non-perceptual. On this basis, Rosenthal (2004) proceeds to develop an account of self-consciousness in terms of purely intellectual thoughts about oneself (more specifically, thoughts that are entertained in the presence of their object or referent).

On the other hand, self-consciousness can sometimes have a quality of immediacy about it (and its way of putting us in contact with its objects) that seems to parallel perceptual consciousness. At the same time, philosophers have sometimes charged that self-consciousness is in fact too immediate, indeed unmediated, to be thought of as quasi-perceptual. Thus, Shoemaker (1996) argues that the quasi-perceptual model falters in construing self-consciousness along the lines of the act-object analysis that befits perceptual consciousness. When one is perceptually conscious of a butterflys meandering, a distinction is always called for between the act of perceptual consciousness and the meandering butterfly it takes as an object. But when one is conscious of ones cheerfulness, a parallel distinction between the act of self-consciousness and ones cheerfulness, supposedly thereby taken as object, is misleading, according to Shoemaker.

One way to interpret Shoemakers claim here is that while Humes argument may be effective against transitive self-consciousness, it is not against intransitive self-consciousness. Recall that transitive self-consciousness requires a duality of mental states, the state of self-consciousness and the state of (for example) cheerfulness. But in intransitive self-consciousness there is no such duality: there is not a distinction between an act of self-consciousness and a separate object taken by it. On this interpretation, Shoemakers claim is that being self-conscious of being cheerful may well be impossible, but it is nonetheless possible to be self-consciously cheerful. We might combine Rosenthals and Shoemakers perspectives and suggest the view that self-consciousness can come in two varieties: intellectual transitive self-consciousness and intransitive self-consciousness. Both varieties escape the clutches of Humes threat: one can catch oneself (with a particular mental state) if the catching is intellectual rather than quasi-perceptual, or if the catching is somehow fused into the particular mental state thereby caught. What Hume showed is that quasi-perceptual transitive self-consciousness is impossible; but this leaves untouched the possibility of intellectual transitive self-consciousness and of intransitive self-consciousness.

In summary, it is quite likely that self-consciousness is indeed possible. But reflecting on the conditions of its possibility puts non-trivial constraints on our conception of self-consciousness. In this respect, contending with Humes challenge still proves immensely fruitful. If anything, it wakes us from our dogmatic slumber about self-consciousness and brings up the question of the nature of self-consciousness.

One question regarding the nature of self-consciousness that arises immediately is what is to count as having self-consciousness. Many contemporary cognitive scientists have operationalized the notion of self-consciousness in terms of experiments on mirror self-recognition and the so-called mark test. In these experiments, a creatures forehead is marked with a visible stain. When placed in front of a mirror, some creatures try to wipe off the stain, which suggests that they recognize themselves in the mirror, while others do not (see mainly Gallup 1970, 1977). Successes with the mark test are few and far between. Among primates, it is passed with any consistency only by humans, chimpanzees, and orangutans, but not by gorillas or gibbons (Suarez and Gallup 1981); and even humans do not typically pass it before the age of a year and a half (Amsterdam 1972) and chimpanzees not before three years of age nor after sixteen years of age (Povinelli et al. 1993). Outside the group of primates, it is passed only by bottlenose dolphins (Reiss and Marino 2001) and Asian elephants (Plotnik et al. 2006). However, this operational treatment of self-consciousness is problematic at a number of levels. Most importantly, it is not entirely clear what the true relationship between mirror self-recognition and self-consciousness is. One would need a principled account of the latter in order to clarify that matter. Mirror self-recognition experiments thus cannot take precedence over the search for an independent understanding of self-consciousness.

To that end, let us consider the ways in which self-consciousness has been claimed to be different, special, and sometimes privileged, relative to consciousness of things other than oneself. Early modern philosophers, from Descartes on, have often claimed certain epistemic privileges on behalf of self-consciousness. More recently, twentieth century analytic philosophers have attempted to identify certain semantic peculiarities of self-consciousness. We take those up in turns.

In what follows, we will consider, somewhat hastily, about a dozen epistemic peculiarities sometimes attributed to self-consciousness. Traditionally, the most discussed special feature claimed on behalf of self-consciousness is infallibility. According to the doctrine of infallibility, ones consciousness of oneself is always veridical and accurate. We may say that whenever I am self-conscious of thinking that p, I am indeed thinking that p. It is important to note, however, that to the extent that self-conscious of is a success verb, this claim would be trivially true, whereas the point of the doctrine under consideration is that it is true even if self-conscious of is not a success verb (or also for any non-success uses of the verb). To bypass this technicality, let us insert parenthetically the qualifier seemingly into our formulation of the claim. We may formulate the doctrine of infallibility as follows:

(DIF) If I am (seemingly) self-conscious of thinking that p, then I am thinking that p.

Thus, whenever I believe something about myself and my mental life, the belief is true: things are in fact the way I believe them to be.

The doctrine of infallibility ensures that my beliefs about my mental life are true. A parallel doctrine ensures that such beliefs are (epistemically) justified. We may, without too much injustice to traditional terminology, call this the doctrine of incorrigibility. The traditional notion of incorrigibility is the notion that the subject cannot possibly be corrected by anyone else, which suggests that the subject is in possession of (and makes correct use of) all the relevant evidence. We may thus formulate the doctrine of incorrigibility as follows:

(DIC) If I am (seemingly) self-conscious of thinking that p, then I am justifiably (seemingly) self-conscious of thinking that p.

Whereas according to DIF, whenever I believe something about my mental life, my belief is true, according to DIC, whenever I believe something about my mental life, my belief is justified.

Against the background of the tripartite analysis of knowledge, the conjunction of DIC and DIF would entail a doctrine about self-knowledge in general, namely:

(DIK) If I am (seemingly) self-conscious that I am thinking that p, then I know that I am thinking that p.

That is, if I am in a state of self-consciousness whose content is I am thinking that p, then my state of self-consciousness will necessarily qualify as knowledge. Note, however, that the thesis is entailed by DIF and DIC only against the background of the tripartite analysisthough it may be independently true. (If the tripartite analysis is incorrect, as it probably is, then the thesis does not follow from the conjunction of DIC and DIF. But it can still be formulated.)

The three doctrines we have considered claim strong privileges on behalf of self-consciousness. But there are stronger ones. Consider the converse of the doctrine of infallibility. DIF ensures that when I am (seemingly) self-conscious of thinking that p, then I am in fact thinking that p. Its converse is a stronger thesis: whenever I think that p, I am self-conscious of doing so. That is, nothing can pass through the mind without the mind taking notice of it. Having a thought entails being self-conscious of having it. Thoughts are, in this sense, self-intimating. We may formulate the doctrine of self-intimation as follows:

(DSI) If I am thinking that p, then I am self-conscious of thinking that p.

Thus, whenever I think something, I inevitably come to believe (or be aware) that I am. Note that DSI entails DIF, because if I am indeed thinking that p, then my self-consciousness of thinking that p must be true or veridical.

A distinction is sometimes made between weak self-intimation and strong self-intimation (Shoemaker 1996). What we have just considered is the weak variety. The strong variety ensures not only that when I think something, I am aware that I think it, but also that when I do not think something, I am aware that I do not think it. Let us formulate the doctrine of strong self-intimation as follows:

(DSSI) If I am thinking that p, then I am self-conscious of thinking that p; and if I am not thinking that p, then I am self-conscious of not thinking that p.

Strong self-intimation renders the mind in some traditional sense transparent to itself. But the term transparency has had such wide currency in recent philosophy of mind that it would be better not to use it in the present context.

Consider now the converse of the doctrine of incorrigibility. It is the thesis that if I think that p, then I am justifiably self-conscious of thinking that p. It also entails DIF, as well as DSI. Again, a strong version can be formulated: If I think that p, then I am justifiably self-conscious of thinking that p; and if I do not think that p, then I am justifiably self-conscious of not thinking that p.

Finally, a parallel thesis could be formulated regarding knowledge: If I think that p, then I know that I think that p. The strong version would be:

(OSC) If I think that p, then I know that I think that p, and if I do not think that p, then I know that I do not think that p.

This last feature is probably the strongest epistemic privilege that could be claimed on behalf of self-consciousness. We may call the associated doctrine the Omniscience of Self-Consciousness. For it is the thesis that one knows everything that happens within ones mind, and everything that does not.

Freuds work on the unconscious has all but refuted the above doctrines (see especially Freud 1915). Thus few if any philosophers would defend them today. But many may consider restricted versions of them. The above doctrines are formulated in terms of thoughts, understood as mental states in general. But some theses can be formulated that would restrict the epistemic privileges to a special subset of mental states, such as sensations and feelings, or phenomenally conscious states, or some such. A thus restricted self-intimation thesis might read: if I have a sensation S, then I am self-conscious of having S; or, if I have a phenomenally conscious state S, then I am self-conscious of having S.

Counter-examples to even such appropriately restricted theses have been offered in the literature. Staying with self-intimation, it has been suggested that there are sensations and conscious states that occur without their subjects awareness. Arguably, I may have a sensationindeed, a phenomenally conscious sensationof the refrigerators hum without becoming self-conscious of it, let alone of myself hearing it.

Consider now a restricted version of the infallibility doctrine: If I am (seemingly) self-conscious of having sensation S, then I do have sensation S. An alleged counter-example is the fraternity initiation story. Suppose that, blindfolded, I am told that a particular spot on my neck is about to be cut with a razor (this is part of my fraternity initiation); then an ice cube is placed on that spot. At the very first instant, I am likely to be under the impression that I am having a pain sensation, while in reality I am having a coldness sensation. That is, at that instant, I am (seemingly) self-conscious of having a pain sensation but do not in fact have a pain sensation, or so the argument goes (see Horgan and Kriegel 2007).

Another way to restrict the above doctrines is by making their claims weaker. Consider the following variation on self-intimation: If I am thinking that p, then I am self-conscious of thinking. Whereas DSI claims that when I have the thought that p, I am self-conscious not just of having a thought, but of having specifically the thought that p, this variation claims only that I am self-conscious of having a thoughtsome thought.

We can apply strictures of this type to any of the above doctrines, and some of the resulting theses may be quite plausible. Thus, consider the following thesis:

If I am (seemingly) self-conscious of being in a phenomenally conscious state S, then I am in some phenomenally conscious state.

It is difficult to conceive of a situation in which one is aware of oneself as being in some conscious state when in fact one is in no conscious state (and hence is unconscious). In particular, the fraternity initiation tale does not tell against this thesis: although in the story I am not in fact in a pain state, I am nonetheless in some conscious state.

Such nuanced theses may thus survive modern critiques of the traditional doctrines of epistemic privilege. Their exploration in the literature is, in any case, far from complete. But let us move on to the semantic privileges sometimes imputed on self-consciousness.

On the two extremes, the first-person pronoun I has been claimed by some to be entirely non-referential (Anscombe 1975) and by others to be the only true form of reference (Chisholm 1976 Ch. 3, and in a more nuanced way, Lewis 1979). Presumably, analogous statements could be made about the concept we use in thought in order to think about ourselves in the first person. For convenience, I will call the relevant concept the Mentalese first-person pronoun, or just the Mentalese I. Plausibly, the special features of linguistic self-reference (the way I refers) derive from, or at least parallel, corresponding features of self-consciousness, and more specifically mental self-reference (the way the Mentalese I refers). In the present context, it is the latter that interest us. Our discussion will focus on two main features. In the next section, we will consider the alleged essential indexicality of self-consciousness (Perry 1979) and irreducibility of de se thoughts (Castaeda 1966, 1967, 1968, 1969). (These terms will be explicated in due course.) The present section considers a semantic peculiarity pointed out by Sydney Shoemaker (1968) under the name immunity to error through misidentification relative to the first-person pronoun and related peculiarities discussed by Anscombe (1975), Evans (1982), and others.

When I think about things other than myself, there are two ways in which my thoughts may turn out to be false. Suppose I think that my next-door neighbor is a nice person. I may be wrong about either (i) whether he is a nice person or (ii) who my next-door neighbor is. The first error is one of mispredication, if you will, whereas the second is one of misidentification. Thus, if I mistake my neighbors tendency to smile for kindness, when in fact it serves a cynical ploy to lure me into signing an unjust petition against the superintendent, then I make a mistake of the first kind. By contrast, if I mistake the mailman for my next-door neighbor, and think that it is my next-door neighbor who is a nice person, when in fact it is the mailman who is, then I make a mistake of the second kind.

In this sense, my thought that my next-door neighbor is a nice person displays a composite structure, involving identification and predication. We may represent this by saying that my thought has the internal structure my next-door neighbor is the person smiling at me every morning & the person smiling at me every morning is a nice person, or more generally my next-door neighbor is the & the is a nice person. This is not to say that when I think that my next-door neighbor is a nice person I am thinking this as a conjunction, or that my thought takes a conjunctive proposition as its object. The above conjunctive representation of my thought is meant just as a device to bring out the fact that my thought has a composite structure. The point is just that my thought has two separable components, an identificational component and a predicational component.

Correspondingly, we can envisage three sorts of semantic peculiarity or privilege. (1) There could be a kind of thought K1, such that if a thought T is of that kind, then T can only be false due to mispredication; thoughts of kind K1 are thus immune to error through misidentification. (2) There could be a kind of thought K2, such that if T is of that kind, then T can only be false due to misidentification; thoughts of kind K2 are thus immune to error through mispredication. (3) There could be a kind of thought K3, such that if T is of that kind, then T can be false due to neither mispredication nor misidentification; thoughts of kind K3 are thus immune to error tout court. The above are just definitions of privileges. It remains to be seen whether any of these definitions is actually satisfied. Shoemakers claim is that the first definition is indeed satisfied by a certain subset of thoughts about oneself.

Note that the third peculiarity, immunity to error tout court, is basically infallibility. This way of conceiving of immunity to error through misidentification brings out its relation to the more traditional doctrine of infallibility. Unlike the latter, the doctrine of immunity to error through misidentification does not claim blanket immunity. But it does restrict in a principled manner the ways in which the relevant thoughts may turn out to be false. If I think that I feel angry, then I can be wrong about whether that is a feeling I really have, but I cannot be wrong about whom it is that is allegedly angry.

We said that according to Shoemaker, a certain subset of thoughts about oneself is immune to error through misidentification. What subset? One can think about oneself under any number of descriptions. And some descriptions one may not be aware of as applying to one. Thus, I may think that my mothers nieceless brothers only nephew is brown-eyed, without being aware that I am my mothers nieceless brothers only nephew. In that case, I think about myself, but not as myself. We might say that I have a thought about myself, but not a self-aware thought about myself. Let us call self-aware thoughts about oneself I-thoughts. According to Shoemaker, some I-thoughts are immune to error through misidentification, namely, those I-thoughts that are directed to ones mind and mental life, as opposed to ones body and corporeal life. (To take an example from Wittgenstein, suppose I see in the mirror a tangle of arms and I mistakenly take the nicest one to be mine. I may think to myself I have a nice arm. In that case, I may not only be wrong about whether my arm is nice, but also about whom it is that has a nice arm. Such an I-thought, being about my body, is not immune to error through misidentification. But my thoughts about my mind are so immune, claims Shoemaker.) More accurately, as we will see later on, Shoemaker holds that absolute, as opposed to circumstantial, immunity to error through misidentification applies only to mental I-thoughts.

We should distinguish two versions of the doctrine of immunity. According to the first, the relevant I-thoughts cannot be false through misidentification because the identifications they involve are always and necessarily correct; call this the infallible identification (II) version of the doctrine of immunity. According to the second version, the relevant I-thoughts cannot be false through misidentification because they do not involve identification in the first place; call this the identificationless reference (IR) version of the doctrine of immunity. (Brook [2001] speaks of ascriptionless reference, which may also be a good label for the specific feature under consideration.) Both versions claim a certain distinction on behalf of the relevant I-thoughts, but the distinction is very different. The first version claims the distinction of infallible identification, whereas the second one claims the distinction of dispensable identification.

Shoemaker appears to hold the IR version (see, for example, Shoemaker 1968: 558). In some respects this is the more radical version. On the II version, I-thoughts have the same composite structure as other thoughts. When I think that I am amused, the content of my thought has the structure I am the & the is amused. It is just that there is something special about the identificational component in the relevant I-thoughts that makes it impervious to error. Whenever I think that I am the , I am. The IR version is more radical. It claims that the relevant I-thoughts do not have the same composite structure as other thoughtsthat they are structurally different. More specifically, they lack any identificational component. My thought that I am amused hooks onto me in some direct, identification-free way.

The distinction between these two versions is important, because the burden of argument is very different in each case. To make the case for II, one would have to argue that the relevant self-identifications are infallible. To make the case for IR, by contrast, one would have to argue that the relevant I-thoughts are identification-free. There is also a corresponding difference in explanatory burden. II must explain how is it that certain acts of identification are impervious to error, whereas IR must explain how is it that some acts of reference can dispense with identification altogether (How do they hook onto the right referent without identifying it?).

Shoemakers (1968) argument for IR, in its barest outlines, proceeds as follows. Suppose (for reductio) that every self-reference required self-identification. Then every thought with a content I am F would have the internal structure I am the & the is F. That is, ascertaining that one is F would require that one identify oneself as the and then establish that the is F. But this would entail that the same would apply to I am the : it would have to have the internal structure I am the & the is the . That is, in order to ascertain that one is the , one would have to first identify oneself as the and then establish that the is the . And so on ad infinitum. To avert infinite regress, at least some self-reference must be identification-free.

To claim that immunity to error through misidentification is a peculiarity of self-consciousness is to claim that it is a feature peculiar to self-consciousness. One can deny this claim in two ways: (i) by arguing that it is not a feature of self-consciousness, and (ii) by arguing that it is not peculiar to self-consciousness (that is, although it is a feature of self-consciousness, it is also a feature of other forms of consciousness).

Several philosophers have pursued (i). Perhaps the most widely discussed argument is the following, due to Gareth Evans (1982: 108). On the basis of seeing in a mirror a large number of hands, one of which is touching a piece of cloth, and a certain feeling I have in my hand, as of touching a piece of cloth, I come to think that I am feeling a piece of cloth. But this is false, and false due to misidentification: I am not the one who is feeling the piece of cloth. Therefore, there are states of self-consciousness that are not immune to error through misidentification; so such immunity is not a feature of self-consciousness as such.

Arguably, however, this is not a pure case of self-consciousness. The thought in question involves self-consciousness, but it is also partly consciousness of something external, and it is the latter part of it that leads to the error. Consider the difference between the thought I am feeling a piece of cloth and the thought I am having a feeling as of a piece of cloth, or even more perspicuously, I am having a cloth-ish feeling. It is clear that if it turns out to be erroneous that I am having a cloth-ish feeling, it is not because I have misidentified myself in the mirror. Indeed, what I see in the mirror is entirely irrelevant to the truth of my thought that I am having a cloth-ish feeling.

More often, philosophers have pursued (ii), arguing that immunity to error through misidentification is not peculiar to self-consciousness. Evans (1982) himself, for instance, argued that thoughts about ones body, and even certain perceptions and perception-based judgments, can be equally immune to error through misidentification, indeed be identification-free. When I think that my legs are crossed, my thought seems to be immune to error through misidentification: it cannot turn out that someones legs are indeed crossed, but not mine.

One response would be to claim that thoughts about ones own body are a genuine form of self-consciousness, albeit bodily self-consciousness. But another would be to draw finer distinctions between kinds of immunity and attach a specific sort of immunity to self-consciousness. Shoemaker (1968) distinguished between absolute and circumstantial immunity to error through misidentification, claiming that only the relevant I-thoughts exhibit the absolute variety. In the same vein, McGinn (1983) distinguishes between derivative and non-derivative immunity to error through misidentification, and Pryor (1999) between de re misidentification and which-object misidentification, both claiming that only the relevant I-thoughts exhibit the latter. However, Stanley (1998) erects a considerable challenge to all these attempts. The issue of whether some kind of immunity to error through misidentification is a peculiarity of self-consciousness is still very much debated.

Let us end this section with a few general points. First, immunity to error through misidentification is at bottom a semantic, not an epistemic, peculiarity. It concerns the special way the Mentalese I hooks onto its referent. Thus, immunity to error through misidentification is not to be confused with immunity to error through unjustified identification, immunity to unjustifiedness through misidentification, or immunity to unjustifiedness through unjustified identificationall of which would be epistemic peculiarities.

Second, immunity to error through misidentification is a semantic peculiarity of strong self-consciousness, not weak self-consciousness, since it involves essentially consciousness of oneself, not just consciousness of a particular thought of one. So, if I am (seemingly) self-conscious of thinking that p, it may be that I am not thinking that p, but only because it is not thinking that p that I am doingnot because it is not I who is doing the thinking.

Third, Shoemakers discovery of immunity preceded the Kripkean revolution in philosophy of language and more generally the theory of reference. A question therefore arises concerning the relation between his claim that self-reference is identification-free and Kripkes claim that many kinds of reference are direct or rigid. Direct referencewhich is commonly thought to characterize proper names, natural kind terms, and indexicalsis reference that is sense-free, if you will: it does not employ a sense, or mode of presentation, in hooking onto the referent. What is the relation, then, between sense-free reference and identification-free reference?

A natural thought is that some (perhaps all) senses are identifications, and so identification-freedom is simply one special case of sense-freedom. If so, Shoemakers discovery may be just a foreshadowing of the Kripkean revolution: it is the discovery of the possibility of sense-free reference, but with an overly restrictive assessment of its scope (where Kripke claimed that all sorts of representational devices are sense-free, Shoemaker thought that only I is).

But there is also another view of the matter. Kripkes directly referential terms do not employ senses, but they do employ reference-fixers. When I think that Tom is generous, there is something that fixes the reference of my Mentalese concept for Tomfor example, the fact that Tom is the salient person called Tom. This reference-fixing fact is not necessarily something I am aware of, which is why it does not qualify as a sense. But it is nonetheless operative in the reference-fixing. When thinking that Tom is generous, I am performing an identification of Tom, albeit an implicit identification, one of which I am not explicitly aware. One way to interpret Shoemakers claim is that self-reference does not even employ a reference-fixer. It is not only sense-free, but also reference-fixer-free. It is not only that the relevant I-thoughts hook onto oneself without the subject performing an explicit identification, but they hook onto oneself without the subject performing any identification, explicit or implicit. If so, Shoemakers claim is more radical than Kripkean direct reference: identification-free reference is not just direct, it is entirely unmediated.

A similar point can be made with respect to Elizabeth Anscombes claim that, unlike all other expressions, I cannot fail to refer. So I-thoughts are secure from reference-failure (Anscombe 1975: 149). That is, such I-thoughts as I am feeling hungry are, in effect, immune to error through reference-failure. What is the relation between immunity to error through misidentification and immunity to error through reference-failure? One view would be that there is no differencethe two are the same. But this would make Shoemakers ultimate claim that the relevant I-thoughts enjoy identification-freedom the same as Anscombes ultimate claim that they enjoy reference-freedom. Shoemaker states explicitly that I does refer, though in some identification-free manner. One way to make sense of this is by appeal, again, to freedom from reference-fixing. Here identification-free reference is construed as reference-fixer-free reference. On this view, the Mentalese I is referential, but it has the peculiarity that its reference is unmediated by any reference-fixing mechanism.

A crucial issue that remains unaddressed is how reference-fixer-free reference is possible. How can a representational item find its referent without any mechanism ensuring a connection between them? Any general theory of self-consciousness that embraces Shoemakers IR version of the doctrine of immunity must explain the possibility of reference unfixed. To my knowledge, this challenge remains to be broached in the literature.

In the last section we saw that, when one employs the Mentalese I in thought, ones thought probably acquires certain unusual features. In this section, we will see that in certain thoughts one cannot avoid employing the Mentalese I. This, too, is a semantic peculiarity, albeit of a different order.

In a well-known story, John Perry tells of his experience following a trail of sugar in a supermarket and thinking to himself The shopper with the torn bag of sugar is making a mess. Upon realizing that he is the person with the torn bag, he forms a new thought, I am making a mess. This thought is new: its functional role is different from the one of the original thought. Perrys subsequent actions can be explained by ascribing to him this I-thought in a way they cannot by ascribing to him the I-free thought. Perry calls beliefs such as I am making a mess locating beliefs, and argues that such beliefs cannot avoid employing Mentalese indexicals. There is no way to think the same thought without employing the Mentalese I. Such a thought thus contains an essential indexical, or more accurately, essentially contains an indexical reference. In this sense, these thoughts are irreducible to any other, non-indexical kind of thought.

It should be emphasized that the point here is not that such I-thoughts cannot be reported by anyone other than the subject, or that such first-person reports cannot be matched by third-person reports. In direct speech (oratio recta), one might report Perrys I-thought as follows:

(1) Perry thinks I am making a mess.

The same report could be made more naturally in indirect speech (oratio obliqua). In order to do so, however, one would need to employ what linguists call an indirect reflexive. Some languages apparently contain unique words for the indirect reflexives. English does not. But fortunately, the English indirect reflexives were discerned in the late 1960s by Hector-Neri Castaeda (curiously perhaps, not himself a native speaker). Castaeda showed that (1) is equivalent to:

(2) Perry thinks that he himself is making a mess.

At least this is so for paradigmatic uses of he himself. (There are also uses of he that function in this way, but these are more rare. And there are probablysomewhat unusualuses of he himself that do not function this way. Castaeda introduced the term he* as a term that behaves as an indirect reflexive in all its uses.) Castaeda called reports of this sort de se (that is, of oneself) and claimed that de se reports cannot be paraphrased into any de dicto or de re reports, and are thus semantically unique and irreducible. Correlatively, the mental states reported in de se reports, to which we may refer as de se thoughts, are irreducible to mental states reported in de dicto and de re reports. In a material mode of speech, this means that states of self-consciousness form an irreducible class of mental states.

Note, in any case, that Castaedas thesis is a generalization from Perrys thesis about reports of ones own self-conscious states (that is, first-person reports) to all reports of self-conscious states, including reports of others self-conscious states (third-person reports). According to Castaedas thesis, self-reference is irreducible to either de dicto or de re reference to what is in fact oneself. Castaeda argues for this by showing that the indirect reflexives he himself, she herself, and so forth, have special logical features. Thus (2) cannot be paraphrased into any (indirect-speech) report that does not employ he himself. Consider the following de dicto report:

(3) Perry thinks that the author of The Essential Indexical is making a mess.

The truth conditions of (3) and (2) are different, since the latter does not entail the former: Perry may be unaware that it is he who is the author of The Essential Indexical (that is, that he himself is the author of The Essential Indexical). So (3) and (2) are not equivalent. Presumably, the same goes for any other description the that picks out Perry uniquelyit could always be that Perry is unaware that he himself is the .

Consider next a de dicto report with a proper name instead of a definite description:

(4) Perry thinks that Perry is making a mess.

Again, Perry may be unaware that it is he who is Perry. Therefore, the truth conditions of (2) and (4) are different, and the two are not equivalent. What about the de re versions of (3) and (4)? These can be obtained, in fact, by reading the author of The Essential Indexical and Perry in (3) and (4) as used, in Donnellans (1966) terms, referentially rather than attributively. But the de re versions are more perspicuously put as follows:

(5) Perry thinks, of the author of The Essential Indexical, that he is making a mess.

(6) Perry thinks, of Perry, that he is making a mess.

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Self-Consciousness | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

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"We are more ready to try the untried when what we do is inconsequential. Hence the remarkable fact that many inventions had their birth as toys."

"Decide what you want, decide what you are willing to exchange for it. Establish your priorities and go to work."

"Most of us can learn to live in perfect comfort on higher levels of power. Everyone knows that on any given day there are energies slumbering in him which the incitements of that day do not call forth. Compared with what we ought to be, we are only half awake.It is evident that our organism has stored-up reserves of energy that are ordinarily not called upon ? deeper and deeper strata of explosible material, ready for use by anyone who probes so deep. The human individual usually lives far within his limits."

"Only those who dare to fail greatly can ever achieve greatly."

"It is time for us all to stand and cheer for the doer, the achiever ? the one who recognizes the challenge and does something about it. "

Many marriages would be better if the husband and wife clearly understood that they'reon the same side.

There's not a lot you can do about the national economy but there is a lot you can do aboutyour personal economy.

"The heights by great men reached and kept,Were not obtained by sudden flightBut they, while their companions slept,Were toiling upward in the night.

You don't drown by falling in water; you only drown if you stay there.

Standing on what too long we boreWith shoulders bent and downcast eyes,We may discern ? unseen before,A path to higher destinies."

"Where the willingness is great, the difficulties cannot be great."

The more you express gratitude for what you have the more you will have to expressgratitude for.

"Hell begins on the day when God grants us a clear vision of all that we might have achieved, of all the gifts which we might have wasted, of all that we might have done which we did not do."

"Someone has defined genius as intensity of purpose: the ability to do, the patience to wait. . . . Put these together and you have genius, and you have achievement."

"Only if you reach the boundary will the boundary recede before you. And if you don't, if you confine your efforts, the boundary will shrink to accommodate itself to your efforts. And you can only expand your capacities by working to the very limit."

"Achievement is largely the product of steadily raising one's levels of aspiration . . and expectation."

"Never tell people how to do things. Tell them what to do and they will surprise you with their ingenuity."

"Five minutes, just before going to sleep, given to a bit of directed imagination regarding achievement possibilities of the morrow, will steadily and increasingly bear fruit, particularly if all ideas of difficulty, worry or fear are resolutely ruled out and replaced by those of accomplishment and smiling courage."

"Competition is a by-product of productive work, not its goal. A creative man is motivated by the desire to achieve, not by the desire to beat others."

"She looked at the crowd and she felt, simultaneously, astonishment that they should stare at her, when this event was so personally her own that no communication about it was possible, and a sense of fitness that they should be here, that they should want to see it, because the sight of an achievement was the greatest gift a human being could offer to others."

"There are only two roads that lead to something like human happiness. They are marked by the words . . . love and achievement. . . . In order to be happy oneself it is necessary to make at least one other person happy. . . . The secret of human happiness is not in self-seeking but in self-forgetting."

"A handful of pine-seed will cover mountains with the green majesty of forest. I too will set my face to the wind and throw my handful of seed on high."

Kids go where there is excitement. They stay where there is love.

"The things we accept as normal and enjoy today were considered impossible twenty-fiveyears ago and beyond the power of man to achieve. The early "Buck Rogers" and "Flash Gordon"comic strips were fantastic and considered outside the realm of man's attainment. They wereconsidered figments of man's imagination, but now many of these miraculous, imaginative thingshave become realities and man is pushing onward toward new and higher goals of achievement. Weare now mentally prepared for every new invention and advancement in technology and the sciences, but, nevertheless, stand amazed at man's powers to create and achieve. These outstandingaccomplishments, which approach the miraculous, to me are unquestioned evidence of man's divinenature.Man has sent up satellites which circle the globe. He has taken the breathtaking, miraculousride about the earth. He expects to circle the moon and even land man on the outer planets;also he considers feasible floating platforms in outer space as intermediate stations forinterplanetary travel."

When you give a man a dole you deny him his dignity, and when you deny him his dignityyou rob him his destiny.

The more you express gratitude for what you have the more you will have to expressgratitude for.

Winner's Blueprint for AchievementBELIEVE while others are doubting.PLAN while others are playing.STUDY while others are sleeping.DECIDE while others are delaying.PREPARE while others are daydreaming.BEGIN while others are procrastinating.WORK while others are wishing.SAVE while others are wasting.LISTEN while others are talking.SMILE while others are frowning.Kids go where there is excitement. They stay where there is love.

COMMEND while others are criticizing.PERSIST while others are quitting."

"Periods of tranquility are seldom prolific of creative achievement. Mankind has to be stirred up."

"Do not let what you cannot do interfere with what you can do."

"You are not here merely to make a living. You are here in order to enable the world to live more amply, with greater vision, with a finer spirit of hope and achievement. You are here to enrich the world, and you impoverish yourself if you forget the errand."

"You can do anything you wish to do, have anything you wish to have, be anything you wish to be."

"Man is not the sum of what he has but the totality of what he does not yet have, of what he might have."

"Achievement seems to be connected with action. Successful men and women keep moving. They make mistakes, but they don't quit."

"Personal development is your springboard to personal excellence. Ongoing, continuous, non-stop personal development literally assures you that there is no limit to what you can accomplish."

"The only people who achieve much are those who want knowledge so badly that they seek it while the conditions are still favorable. Favorable conditions never come."

"The only way to discover the limits of the possible is to go beyond them into the impossible."

It's not the situation, but wheather we react (negative) or respond (positive) tothe situation that's important.

Link:
ACHIEVEMENT - Motivating Quotes

NEW, IMPROVED Relaxing Music for Cats! Calm Your Energetic Cat with this Soothing Music (2018) - If your cat is too energetic or hyperactive, this is the perfect music therapy for them! Calm your anxious or over energetic cat with this relaxing, natural music remedy for cats and kittens! Keep your cat relaxed and soothe them to sleep, stop aggressive or destructive behaviours and reduce stress with this magic music!

Relax My Cat are experts in creating relaxing music to help calm your cat and help them sleep. Our music is composed in-house by our team of producers, and uses binaural technology designed to relax and calm your cat. If your cat has sleeping problems or anxiety problems or is even stressed during construction, fireworks or other loud noises, you should try our music.

Relax My Cat Music on iTunes: https://itunes.apple.com/gb/artist/re...

Relax My Cat's music will help to calm and soothe your cat or kitten in a variety of situations. Minimise separation anxiety, reduce hyperactivity, minimise fear of thunderstorms or fireworks, stop unwanted whining, comfort sick or injured cats and calm your cat on car journeys - Relax My Cat does it all!

Our music is based on feline vocal communication and environmental sounds that pique the interest of cats; it is written in a musical language that is uniquely designed to appeal to the domestic cat. All of the music is recorded on traditional instruments and the human voice. No actual cat, mouse, or bird calls are used (although it may sound like it).

Relax My Cats music is unique, and will help in a variety of situations as a substitute for medication. We have helped thousands of cats and kittens worldwide to sleep and reduce their anxiety. Music therapy for your cat can keep them calm, happy and healthy, and it is a great way to rehabilitate rescue cats - or just get your kitten or cat used to their new home.

Being re-homed is an incredibly stressful time for cats - as they have to get used to a lot of different sights and sounds, as well as their new family and any other pets in the household. We recommend that you play Relax My Cat during this time, and it will help reduce their heart rate and relax them while they explore their new surroundings. No more whining kittens - they will get used to your home in no time at all with the help of Relax My Cat's music!

You may be litter training, which can be a stressful time for both dog and parent, and our music will soothe your kitten making your life easier. When listening to Relax My Cat you will notice your kitten start to relax, and get more used to their tray, or similarly if you are training them to get used to their travel box.

It is also very useful to calm your cat during car journeys - which many kittens find a stressful time. They may associate it with vets visits - so we recommend playing Relax My Cat's music before and after visits to the vet to reduce their stress.

The worst time of year for over 60% of cats is Firework season - the loud bangs are really scary for them and you may notice a huge change in your kitty during this time. Thunderstorms are another difficult time for cats, with the majority of cats being very scared of storms because of the unfamiliar loud noises. Relax My Cat is the perfect solution to this anxiety inducing situation - just play our music to reduce your cats anxiety and make them feel safe.

The most common problem we hear is separation anxiety in cats - being separated from you can cause severe anxiety in many cats. Relax My Cats music has improved thousands of cases of separation anxiety and noisy felines all over the world.

Our music will help cats of all breeds and ages to stay relaxed and keep calm. We are also on a number of social media platforms - so join our community and let's chat! We love to hear about and see pictures of your kitties!

Facebook : https://www.facebook.com/RelaxMyCat/ Google+ : https://plus.google.com/+relaxmycat Twitter: https://twitter.com/relaxmycat Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/relaxmycat

Read more:

NEW, IMPROVED Relaxing Music for Cats! Calm Your Energetic ...

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Zig Ziglar On Sellinghttps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dFdKX...

How To Get Everything In Life You Want With Zig Ziglarhttps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eQ1PK...

Zig Ziglar - The Law Of Attraction: Believe In Yourself https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f9V-J...

True Performance: Faith - With Zig Ziglarhttps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RqL7O...

True Performance: Believe In Yourself - With Zig Ziglarhttps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F_Tw6...

True Performance: Attitude - With Zig Ziglarhttps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Mj7KZ...

Zig Ziglar Secrets: Secrets For Closing The Sale - The Shame Closehttps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=c9Txr...

"Evaluate Where You Are" With Zig Ziglarhttps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NE-gM...

Zig Ziglar - Qualities Of Successhttps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3UNDf...

Zig Ziglar Motivation - See You At The Top! https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hg8ci...

See original here:
Zig Ziglar - The Law Of Attraction: Believe In Yourself ...

Osho defies categorization. His thousands of talks cover everything from the individual quest for meaning to the most urgent social and political issues facing society today.

Oshos books are not written but are transcribed from audio and video recordings of his extemporaneous talks to international audiences. As he puts it, So remember: whatever I am saying is not just for you... I am talking also for the future generations. Osho has been described by the Sunday Times in London as one of the 1000 Makers of the 20th Century and by American author Tom Robbins as the most dangerous man since Jesus Christ. Sunday Mid-Day (India) has selected Osho as one of ten people along with Gandhi, Nehru and Buddha who have changed the destiny of India. About his own work Osho has said that he is helping to create the conditions for the birth of a new kind of human being. He often characterizes this new human being as Zorba the Buddha capable both of enjoying the earthy pleasures of a Zorba the Greek and the silent serenity of a Gautama the Buddha. Running like a thread through all aspects of Oshos talks and meditations is a vision that encompasses both the timeless wisdom of all ages past and the highest potential of todays (and tomorrows) science and technology.

Osho is known for his revolutionary contribution to the science of inner transformation, with an approach to meditation that acknowledges the accelerated pace of contemporary life. His unique OSHO Active Meditations are designed to first release the accumulated stresses of body and mind, so that it is then easier to take an experience of stillness and thought-free relaxation into daily life.

See the article here:
Osho: About Osho

Dates, Donation & Travel

Camp 6 -28th Apr to 3rd May( AE. YES & YES 2)

Camp 7 -3rd May to 8th May ( AE, YES& YES 2 )

Camp 8 -8th May to 13th May( AE & YES )F

Camp 9 -13th to 18th May (AE,YES& YES 2 ) Camp 10 -18th May to 23rd May( AE & YES )

Camp 11 -23rd May to 28th May( AE,YES& YES 2) F

Camp 12 -28th May to 2nd June( AE & YES )

AE- ART EXCEL (Utkarsha Yoga) -

(Art of Living kids course for 8 to 13 yrs)

YES- Youth Empowerment Seminar (Medha Yoga)

(Art of Living Teens course for14 to 17yrs)

YES 2-Level 2 programforYES graduates

IP (PY)-Prajna Yoga(Intuition Process) for 8 to 17 years

To know more click

F indicates that its a Family Retreat. During these dates only Parents can do any Art of Living course - HP or Part 2 orSSY 2 while theirKids participate in Camps. In other camps Parents strictly not allowed.For details talk to our representatives.

Donation

for AE/ YES + CAMP = Rs. 5600/-(5 sharing room)for YES 2 + CAMP =Rs. 6100/-(5 sharing room)

forAE/ YES + CAMP = Rs. 4600/- ( Dormitory )for YES 2 + CAMP =Rs. 5100/-(Dormitory)

for Intuition Process = Rs. 10.000/-

Donation for Prajna Yoga (Intuition Process)is over and above the camp donation and it is optional. It will be conducted on the 2nd lastday from 5:30pm to 8:30pm & on the last day from 7am to 10am. Kids doing Prajna Yoga will not miss any activities as it will happen during satsang & yoga time

To know moreclick here

10 years Celebration Offers

Group Booking discount- 5 participants paying in a week are entitled to group booking discount of

Rs. 1000/- i.e. Rs. 200/- each

2009 born kids discount- Rs. 600 discount for a group of 3 children (Rs.200/- each) who areborn in 2009 (ID proof is mandatory for all 3)

Post AOL CAMPS activities video on FB& tag10 people to geta Gift - Head Gearfor your Child

Please note the above offers will not be valid 3days before therespective camp

A/c Bus ServiceCharges

chargesfor to & fro Travel in A/C Bus

Rs. 500 forPune Cityto Triveni Ashram& BackRs. 1500 for Mumbai to Triveni ashram & Back

(Snacks will be provided in MumbaiBus)

(Kindly scroll down for bus routes)

2 days prior to a Camp, bus booking charges will increase by Rs.200

Reporting on the 1st day of the Camp between 3pm to4pm andDeparture on the last day after 2pm

Kindly Note1. Registerat least 10days beforeeach camp to avoid disappointments of not getting a seat 2. Donation will increase by Rs. 300,3 days before everycamp3. Donationis non-refundable under any situation. However,it can be adjusted against some other participant. In case participant can not make it for chosen date then he can come on another date.

Such changes must be emailed to us at least 3 days priorcamp

4. Moving theCamp Datejust 1 day prior to the commencement ofcamp will entail an additional charge ofRs.1000.

More here:

AOL CAMPS, Art of Living Camps at Triveni Ashram. Pune